1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE WESTERN DIS	TRICT OF WASHINGTON	
3	Richard Tyler Frazer,		
4	Plaintiff,		
5	vs.		
6	The United States of America; The United		
7	States Patent and Trademark Office;	COMPLAINT	
8	Michael Carone, Supervisory Patent Examiner;	FOR DAMAGES	
9	John Dudas, Commissioner of Patents;		
10	John Radi, Patent Examiner; and		
11	Lulit Semunegus, Patent Examiner,		
12	Defendants.		
3	Parties to th	is Complaint:	
4	Plaintiff:		
5	Richard Tyler Frazer		
6	9 Poplar Road # 41		
7	Montesano, Washington 98563		
8	(360) 249-5441		
	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES Page 1 of 23 Case No.	Richard Tyler Frazer 9 Poplar Road # 41 Montesano, WA. 98563 (360) 249-5441	

1	Defen	dants:
2	1.	The United States of America
3		United States Department of Justice
4		United States Attorney General
5		950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
6		Washington, D.C. 20530
7	2.	United States Patent and Trademark Office
8		Office of the General Counsel
9		10B20, Madison Building East
10		600 Dulany Street
11		Alexandria, VA
12		(571) 272-7000
13	3.	Michael Carone, in his official capacity as Supervisory Patent Examiner for the United
14		States Patent and Trademark Office
15	4.	John Dudas, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Patents for the United States
16		Patent and Trademark Office
17	5.	John Radi, in his official capacity as Patent Examiner for the United States Patent and
18		Trademark Office
19	6.	Lulit Semunegus, in her official capacity as Patent Examiner for the United States Patent
20		and Trademark Office
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1	Jurisdiction:
2	Jurisdiction in this action is predicated upon:
3	United States Code, Title 28, Sections 1331, 1332 and 1346(b);
4	The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, in part, which reads, "To promote the
5	progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
6	exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.";
7	The Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and
8	The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), United States Code, Title 5, Section 504 and United
9	States Code, Title 28, Section 2412
10	Statement of Claim:
11	Plaintiff spent four years drafting an application for a Non-provisional Utility Patent in
12	which he was solely responsible for all aspects of said application.
13	On August 14, 2003, Plaintiff mailed his Non-provisional Utility Patent Application
14	entitled "Method of Propulsion and Attitude Control in Fluid Environments and Vehicles
15	Utilizing Said Method," by first class United States Postal Service mail, to the United Patent and
16	Trademark Office (USPTO) at the address of: Mail Stop Patent Application, Commissioner of
17	Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450.

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of IDS related documents, 301 pages and (7) Return Postcard.

Plaintiff included with this patent application: (1) UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION

TRANSMITTAL, 1 page, form PTP/SB/05 (80-03); (2) FEE TRANSMITTAL for FY 2003, 2

Application Data Sheet, 2 pages, (5) Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), 1 page, (6) Copies

pages, form PTO/SB/17 (08-03); (3) \$375.00 cashiers check as BASIC FILING FEE; (4)

1	Plaintiff's Non-provisional Utility Patent Application was filed with the United States		
2	Patent and Trademark Office on August 18th, 2003, and was assigned the Application Number:		
3	10/642,554.		
4	According to the document entitled, "CONFIRMATION NO. 4243, FILING RECEIPT,"		
5	henceforth referred to as, "FILING RECEIPT," mailed on November 13th, 2003, Plaintiff's		
6	patent application was first assigned to Art Unit 3617. Art Unit 3617 encompasses		
7	classifications:		
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	<ol> <li>1. 104, Railways</li> <li>2. 105, Railway Rolling Stock</li> <li>3. 114, Ships</li> <li>4. 152, Resilient Tires and Wheels</li> <li>5. 191, Electricity: Transmission to Vehicles</li> <li>6. 213, Railway Draft Appliances</li> <li>7. 238, Railways: Surface Track</li> <li>8. 246, Railway Switches</li> <li>9. 258, Railway Mail Delivery</li> <li>10. 278, Land Vehicles: Animal Draft Appliances</li> <li>11. 291, Track Sanders</li> <li>12. 295, Railway Wheels and Axles</li> <li>13. 301, Land Vehicles: Wheels and Axles</li> <li>14. 305, Wheels Substitutes for Land Vehicles</li> <li>15. 440, Marine Propulsion</li> <li>16. 441, Buoys, Rafts and Aquatic Devices</li> </ol>		
25	Listed as third criteria in Plaintiff's document entitled, "Application Data Sheet," concerning, "Suggested Classification," Plaintiff suggested United States Classification/sub-		
26	classification, "244/12.3," as to which classification Plaintiff believed to be the closest		
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28	classification to which his invention was related. Classification 244/12.3 encompasses:		
29 30 31 32	"Apparatus wherein the aeronautical machine comprises separate and distinct power plants or motive means, at least one of the motive means being used solely for forward or horizontal propulsion and at least one other motive means solely for lift or vertical propulsion."  Listed as fourth criteria in Plaintiff's document entitled, "Application Data Sheet,"		
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34	concerning, "Suggested Group Art Unit," Plaintiff suggested Art Unit, "3644," as to which Art COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES  Page 4 of 23  Richard Tyler Frazer 9 Poplar Road # 41  Montesano, WA. 98563 (360) 249-5441		

1. 244, Aeronautics and Astronautics Classification/sub-classification, 244/12.3, falls under Art Unit 3644.

According to the USPTO document entitled, "RFP DOC-52-PAPT -07-01001, Attachment 1, Appendix to Statement of Work/Specifications, page 1, under the heading, 'USPTO Mission and Work Environment,' sub-heading, "Patent Organization," relevant part:

"Each Technology Center is comprised of Groups and each Group is subdivided into Art Units. Art Unit examiners specialize in a specific subset of technologies, which is referred to as the "art" that they examine."

On January 27th, 2005, more than 17 months from the filing date of Plaintiff's patent application, Plaintiff phoned the USPTO, at the phone number of, (703) 306-5960, to ascertain the status of Plaintiff's patent application as Plaintiff had yet to receive any communication regarding the examination/prosecution of Plaintiff's patent application, excepting the aforementioned FILING RECEIPT. Plaintiff was told by an employee of the USPTO the phone number to Art Unit 3617 was (703) 306-4198. Plaintiff then phoned Art Unit 3617 at the phone number, (703) 360-4198, and was told that his patent application had been reassigned to Art Unit 3641. Plaintiff then re-phoned the USPTO at the phone number, (703) 360-5960 and asked for the phone number to Art Unit 3641. Plaintiff was then transferred to Art Unit 3641, where he left a message inquiring as to the status of Plaintiff's patent application. Plaintiff left his name and application number. Lulit Semunegus returned Plaintiff's patent application. Plaintiff asked that said requirement and the reason for which be made in writing, as there was a bad phone connection.

1	According to the cover sheet of the First Office Action, henceforth referred to as, "FOA,"		
2	mailed upon March 30 <sup>th</sup> , 2005, Plaintiff's patent application had been reassigned to Art Unit		
3	3641. Art Unit 3641 encompasses:		
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<ol> <li>33, Geometrical Instruments</li> <li>42, Firearms</li> <li>86, Ammunition and Explosive-Charge Making</li> <li>89, Ordnance</li> <li>102, Ammunition and Explosives</li> <li>114, Ships</li> <li>124, Mechanical Guns and Projectors</li> <li>244, Aeronautics and Astronautics (Sub-class 3.13)</li> <li>976, Nuclear Technology</li> <li>Regarding number 8, listed above, classification/sub-classification 244/3.13, the only</li> </ol>		
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16			
17 18 19 20	"Subject matter in which the missile is directed to a target by a beam of electromagnetic wave energy which is transmitted from the command source to the target."		
21	henceforth referred to as, "MPEP," is the applicable manual of said name at the time of the		
22	Plaintiff's patent application.		
23	According to MPEP 903.08, relevant part:		
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	"Applicant may be advised of expected application transfers by using Form Paragraph 5.03."  "5.03 Reassignment Affecting Application Location  The Art Unit location of your application in the USPTO has changed. To aid in correlating any papers for this application, all further correspondence regarding this application should be directed to Art Unit [1].  Examiner's Note:  This paragraph should be used in all Office actions when the location of an application is changed due to a reassignment of the art, transfer of the application to a different Art Unit, or transfer of an examiner and the examiner's docket."		

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(360) 249-5441

The record of Ms. Semunegus's tenure shows that she lacked experience in regards to examining/ prosecuting patents in regards to the Art to which Plaintiff's invention is most closely related.

The record of Ms. Semunegus's tenure shows that she lacked experience in regards to examining/ prosecuting patents as a primary examiner. She was employed by the USPTO for about 3 years, considering the Plaintiff's filing date for Plaintiff's patent application, when she was assigned to said patent application as primary examiner.

Ms. Semunegus's close association with Mr. Carone in examining/prosecuting a majority of the patents granted during said tenure further shows that Mr. Carone was knowledgeable of Ms. Semunegus's limitations in regards to experience in relevant Art and in the capacity of a primary examiner.

As it may be raised by the USPTO that it was a discretionary decision to assign Plaintiff's patent application to Ms. Semunegus for examination/prosecution, it is the Plaintiff's position that whoever made that assignment did not display due diligence in making said assignment. The record of Ms. Semunegus's tenure, work-load, area of expertise and lack of experience as a primary examiner are all factors which would be taken into consideration in making a proper assignment of Plaintiff's patent application for an appropriate examination/prosecution of said patent application. By ignoring these factors, whoever assigned the Plaintiff's patent application to Ms. Semunegus was negligent in providing the Plaintiff with a qualified examiner, thereby injuring the Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application.

According to the United State Code, Title 35, Section 121, relevant part:

"If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions."

According to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37, Section 1.141:

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"Two or more independent and distinct inventions may not be claimed in one national application, except that more than one species of an invention, not to exceed a reasonable number, may be specifically claimed in different claims in one national application, provided the application also includes an allowable claim generic to all the claimed species and all the claims to species in excess of one are written in dependent form or otherwise include all the limitations of the generic claim."

Historical and Revision Notes

This section enacts as law existing practice with respect to division, at the same time introducing a number of changes. Division is made discretionary with the Commissioner. The requirements of section 120 are made applicable and neither of the resulting patents can be held invalid over the other merely because of their being divided in several patents. In some cases a divisional application may be filed by the assignee."

## According to LAW.COM Dictionary:

And-conj. This little word is important in law, particularly when compared to or. Most commonly it determines if one or both owners have to sign documents. Example: when an automobile registration reads that the title is for Barney and Sarah Oldfield, then both must sign off upon sale, but if it says "or" then only one will have to sign; if Barney dies then the title is automatically in Sarah's name if it reads "or," but not if it reads "and."

Or-conj. Either; in the alternative. It is often vital to distinguish between "or" and "and." Example: Title to the Cadillac written "Mary or Bill Davidson" means either one could transfer the car, but if written "Mary and Bill Davidson," both must sign to change title.

According to United States Code, Title 35, Section 2(b), relevant part:

"(2)May establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which. (A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office;"

The USPTO has devoted an entire section to restriction based upon 35 USC, 121 and 37 CFR, 1.141, see MPEP Section 800.

The USPTO has taken the position that it is permissible to require restriction based upon either Independence or Distinctness. See MPEP 800. The USPTO does not have the authority of law as it is written to require restriction in the alternative sense of "Independent" or "Distinct." The applicable law and statute, mentioned above, is strictly written in both as stating, "independent and distinct," meaning that in order to require restriction, an invention must meet

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both qualifications, not one or the other. The USPTO's interpretation of the relevant law and regulation is inconsistent with the law as it is written and is therefore negligent as interpretation of law in this sense is not discretionary. Further more, as requirement for restriction is a discretionary matter for the Director, the law as it is written must be abided by in order to invoke such a discretionary power.

The USPTO in its interpretation of law and regulation in regards to the requirement for restriction gives the USPTO the power to require restriction in which there is no basis in the applicable laws or regulations as written. The USPTO has given itself more power than applicable law or regulation allows.

If Congress intended to allow the Director of the USPTO the discretion of requirement for restriction in the alternative sense of either "Independence" or "Distinctness," Congress could, should or would have written, "independent or distinct," not "independent and distinct."

This act of negligence made a grey area in patent law even more indistinct, injuring

Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that
this act of negligence allows for arbitrary and capricious requirements for restriction in which the
USPTO has no authority to exercise.

As stated before, the USPTO has devoted an entire section of MPEP to Restriction,
MPEP section 800, in which examiners are given to believe that it may be proper to require
restriction in the alternative sense of either "Independent" or "Distinct" inventions. See MPEP
802.01 and 803.

By negligently applying 35 USC 121 and 37 CFR 1.141 in its drafting of MPEP section 800, the USPTO has erroneously informed its examiners that they have the authority to require restriction in cases in which there is no authority to do so derived by law.

On pages 3 and 4, of the FOA, Ms. Semunegus negligently omits any Conclusion.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

On pages 3 and 4, of the FOA, Ms. Semunegus negligently omits section 3., as the numbered sections of the FOA progress directly from 2 to 4.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

At the end of the FOA, Ms. Semunegus, negligently omits the date of drafting of this Office Action and her initials. See MPEP 707.11.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

The Second Office Action (SOA) was mailed on August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2005, over 23 months from the filing date of Plaintiff's patent application. A shortened statutory period for reply of (3) three months was set.

Plaintiff mailed APPLICANT'S REPLY TO SECOND OFFICE ACTION, henceforth referred to as "AP2," on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2005, along with the document form PETITION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME UNDER 37 CFR 1.136(a) FY 2005.

On page 2, of the SOA, section 1, first paragraph, Ms. Semunegus negligently uses the word, "glasses," for the word, "gases."

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future. Furthermore this act of negligence injured Plaintiff by forcing Plaintiff to address an issue of medium not claimed by the Plaintiff in the patent application.

On page 2, of the SOA, section 1, second paragraph, Ms. Semunegus determined that the requirement for restriction was proper and therefore FINAL.

Ms. Semunegus ignored the plain language of the claims, specification, figures and the arguments presented in Plaintiff's AP1 that the invention functioned in ALL fluid mediums. Ms. Semunegus ignored the assertion made by the Plaintiff that his invention could be made to encompass all fluid environments.

Example: The North American Dipper Bird and Diving Petrels utilize their wings as main propulsion and attitude control in both air and water. Both birds essentially "fly" through the air and water. By Ms. Semunegus's argument, the method used by these birds to propel and control themselves in two different fluid environments are two distinct inventions, even though they utilize the exact same structures in the same way with the same methodology. Or, the birds, each and of themselves, should be considered as distinct inventions, one that flies and one that swims. Both birds can fly like a conventional aircraft, hover like a helicopter or VTOL, propel themselves on the surface like a boat and dive like a submarine. Plaintiff only used the terminology available in describing the capacity, use and methodology of Plaintiff's invention. See, Title of Invention. See MPEP 2173.05(a)(II).

As there is currently no applicable classification for the Plaintiff's invention, Plaintiff relied upon the structural nature of Plaintiff's invention in assessing the classification and Art most nearly related to said invention. Such related classification should not be solely used to assess the invention, rather, a reading of the specification and figures should be used in determining new/original classification.

The requirement for restriction had no legal basis and no logical basis, only Ms.

Semunegus's selective interpretation of an Art which she had insufficient knowledge of. By

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being selective in her interpretation and arguments, Ms. Semunegus was negligent in assessing the invention taken as a whole as described in the specification and figures and as claimed.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

On pages 2 and 3, of the SOA, section 3, first paragraph, Ms. Semunegus states, "The specification does not describe the manner or make obvious how electric, hydraulic or steam motors are actually used as the drive fans for this particular vehicle, specifically examiner is unsure how a steam or hydraulic motor will work as a drive fan for this particular vehicle. Furthermore, the specification does not describe or make obvious how and where the mounting points for the drive-fans and drive components are placed or utilized."

Ms. Semunegus was negligent in her reading of the specification and figures. (See Patent Application, Page 23, [120], lines 1-3, pages 31-32, [147, 149], and FIGS. 19a-19c).

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

On page 3, of the SOA, section 5, first and second paragraph, Ms. Semunegus, uses paragraph form 7.34.15, and negligently omits any use or application of MPEP 707.07(j)(I, II and III).

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

On page 3, of the SOA, section 5, third paragraph, Ms. Semunegus, inserts paragraph form 7.34.02, and negligently omits the following portion of said paragraph,

"The term "[1]" in claim [2] is used by the claim to mean "[3]", while the accepted meaning is "[4]." The term is indefinite because the specification does not clearly redefine the term."

1	Ms. Semunegus is negligent in her subjective view that these terms not descriptive. Ms.
2	Semunegus has no lawful, regulatory or rule based authority beyond her naked assertion that
3	these terms are not descriptive to reject said claims. Ms. Semunegus provides no prima facie
4	evidence as to why these terms are not descriptive. See MPEP 2173(d). See also MPEP 2111,
5	MPEP 2173.05(a)(II), MPEP 2173.05(b)(A-F).
6	This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application
7	as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.
8	On page 4, of the SOA, section 8, Ms. Semunegus, lists the term "the dihedral" in which
9	she negligently asserts that there is no antecedent basis for the limitation in this claim. Ms.
10	Semunegus also ignores section MPEP 2173.05(e) in regards to suggesting corrections to
11	antecedent problems.
12	Ms. Semunegus utilizes paragraph form 7.34.05, to make this rejection of claim 2:
13	Dihedral is clearly explained in the specification, pages 25-26, and illustrated by figures,
14	FIGS. 12a-12b.
15	Dihedral is a common term used in aeronautics to describe the angle of a wing in relation
16	to the horizontal plain.
17	Example: Try a Google Search using these three words, "definition", "wing" and
18	"dihedral."
19	This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application
20	as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.
21	On page 4, of the SOA, section 9, Ms. Semunegus, negligently omitted the last digit of
22	the patent regarding Melkuti, listing his patent as "(5,454,53)." The Melkuti patent is patent
22	number "5 454 531 "

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This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

On page 4, of the SOA, section 9, Ms. Semunegus, negligently asserts that the patent regarding Melkuti, patent number 5,454,531, is pertinent to Plaintiff's patent application.

Melkuti consists of a main fan centrally located under the fuselage with an auxiliary fan in each wing assembly. There is no mention or depiction of triangulated structures or components beyond the arrangement of the fans themselves in relation to each other. There is no mention or depiction of hexagonal cell, framework.

Ms. Semunegus's interpretation of Melkuti in regards to the Plaintiff's patent application and invention is over-simplified.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

The USPTO was negligent in mailing the SOA in a timely manner as it carried a drafting date of 7/20/2005 and was not mailed until 8/12/2005. Twenty-three (23) days elapsed between drafting of the SOA and its mailing.

This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.

The Plaintiff phoned Ms. Semunegus on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 2005, at the phone number recited in the SOA, (571) 272-6882, to clarify issues regarding the SOA. Plaintiff was informed by a recorded message stating that the phone number dialed was no longer in service.

Plaintiff then immediately phoned Mr. Carone on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 2005, at the phone number recited in the SOA, (571) 272-6873, to clarify issues regarding the SOA. Plaintiff was informed by Mr. Carone that (1) Ms. Semunegus was no longer employed by the USPTO in an examiner

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capacity of Plaintiff's patent application, (2) that he, Mr. Carone, was not familiar with the Plaintiff's patent application had just been reassigned to John Radi, Art Unit 3641, and (4) Plaintiff was given the phone number to contact Mr. Radi, (571) 272-1000.

On or about August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2005, Plaintiff started to hemorrhage internally as evidenced from copious amounts of blood in defecation.

On January 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006, error in date in AP2 of January 27<sup>th</sup>, 2006, by Plaintiff, Plaintiff, phoned Mr. Radi, at the phone number of (571) 272-1000, to clarify issues regarding Plaintiff's patent application. Plaintiff was informed by an employee of the USPTO that Mr. Radi had a new phone number, (571) 272-5883. Plaintiff phoned Mr. Radi at this number and was told by Mr. Radi that he could not review Plaintiff's patent application until Plaintiff answered the SOA. Plaintiff was also told that he, Mr. Radi, was a new hire. Plaintiff informed Mr. Radi of his health problems and his confusion over the SOA and his need to clarify certain issues. Mr. Radi reiterated that he could not review the Plaintiff's patent application until he received a reply to the SOA.

Plaintiff phoned Mr. Radi on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2006, and told him that he would soon be mailing his reply to the SOA, and he would appreciate it if Mr. Radi talked to Mr. Carone as to waiving the fees applicable to the late reply. Plaintiff was told by Mr. Radi that he would discuss waiving fees with Mr. Carone as to the Plaintiff's assertion that the lateness was due to not being able to clarify issues regarding the SOA and health issues.

To reiterate, Plaintiff mailed his AP2 and PETITION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME UNDER 37 CFR 1.136(a) FY 2005 with instructions for whoever was responsible for processing said form to contact Mr. Carone at (571) 272-6873 regarding fees, on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

1	On March 31 <sup>st</sup> , 2006, Plaintiff, received Notice of Abandonment, mailed March 28 <sup>th</sup> ,		
2	2006, for the reason:		
3 4 5	"A reply was received with a request for extension of time, however appropriate fees were not included in accordance with 37 CFR 1.17(a)(3)."		
6	Forty-eight (48) days elapsed between Plaintiff's AP2 and the Notice of Abandonment.		
7	The USPTO was negligent in informing the Plaintiff of a change in examiner. (See		
8	MPEP 903.08)		
9	This act of negligence injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent application		
10	as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.		
11	The USPTO was negligent in providing the Plaintiff with an examiner knowledgeable of		
12	Plaintiff's patent application, thereby injuring Plaintiff's ability to clarify issues regarding the		
13	SOA. At this point the USPTO effectively abandoned the prosecution of Plaintiff's patent		
14	application. (See MPEP 708.03)		
15	This act of negligence severely injured Plaintiff's ability to prosecute Plaintiff's patent		
16	application as well as injured Plaintiff's ability to defend Plaintiff's invention in the future.		
17	The examination/prosecution of Plaintiff's patent application was totally destructive in		
18	nature. Arguments and naked assertions made by Ms. Semunegus lacked any examples or		
19	reasoning, relying on mere conclusion without any prima facie evidence to validate her		
20	arguments or assertions. MPEP 707.07(j)(II) reads in part:		
21 22	"The examiner's action should be constructive in nature"		
23	Plaintiff mailed by Certified Mail a Claim against the USPTO, on March 30 <sup>th</sup> , 2007, and		
24	said Claim was eventually filed with the USPTO with an acceptance date of April 5th, 2007. The		
25	USPTO rejected Plaintiff's Claim in a letter dated October 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 2007.		
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As the entire file wrapper, including Office Actions can be used as evidence in Ex parte Reexaminations, interference proceedings and infringement litigation, it is the assertion of the Plaintiff that an examination/prosecution of a patent application must be made in a professional manner by an competent and experienced examiner of the Art to which an invention most clearly pertains or is related thereto to have any value.

The value of a granted patent is commensurate with the nature of the examination/prosecution of a patent application. A poor examination/prosecution of a patent application places an unnecessary and unfair burden upon a patent owner in proceedings regarding his or her patent as a patent owner will not only be faced with defending his or her patent but in also defending the negligent actions of the USPTO and its employees.

The acts of negligence as enumerated above, some of which may seem petty in regards to omitted words and misspellings, others more serious such as improper interpretation and application of law, omission of pertinent portions of forms, confusion and intermixing of forms, naked assertions lacking prima facie evidence or reference to statutory authority and pertinent section of MPEP for rejection of claims, the willful disregard of the plain meaning of the specification and claims and arguments made by Plaintiff as to what his invention was and consisted of, and an overall lack of due care and diligence by the USPTO in actually doing anything to aid in the examination/ prosecution of the Plaintiff's patent application and the effective abandonment of Plaintiff's patent application by the USPTO, leaves grave doubts to be held by the Plaintiff as to the whether or not Plaintiff's patent application was effectively abandoned at the assignment of Plaintiff's patent application to Art Unit 3641 in general, and to Michael Carone, Lulit Semunegus and John Radi, specifically.

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